The ideas of Franz Rosenzweig have had relatively little impact outside of the circle of contemporary liberal Jewish thinkers. It is even more unlikely that his name would be found in any of the countless volumes an ethical theory. I argue that the ethical theory implied in his primary philosophical work, The Star of Redemption, is compelling and worth sustained and serious study by a wider audience. ;Rosenzweig rejects an Hegelian totalitarian ontological framework for ethics, in favor of a relational (...) ethics that is based on the immediate demands of a concretely contingent other. I construct the epistemological foundations for such an ethics out of his work, by drawing on an analogy from the new science of chaos and Rosenzweig's avowed reliance on Hermann Cohen's differential calculus of infinitesimals. ;In addition to considering the mathematical symbolic logic that serves to structure his epistemology, I consider how aesthetics plays a role in his ethical theory. I contrast essential elements of Rosenzweig's philosophy with those of Martin Heidegger's in order to specify why these two contemporaries have been so closely associated and why they should be more clearly distinguished from each other. Besides the obvious cultural parameters, what makes them similar is not only their univocal departure from a Western metaphysics of substance, but also a common concern to locate human beings in the vitally relational way that we exist in the world. Their differences are most clearly defined in how each respectively appropriates language and aesthetics in that locative process. ;For Heidegger, art as the way of language par excellence becomes the medium by which a human being becomes aware of his/her own solitary and finite existence through bringing one face-to-face with the ultimate nature of one's own death. For Rosenzweig, that same awareness is countered by his introduction of the revelatory experience of responsible love of one human being for an other, and which he analogically models on a dialogical encounter with God. I argue that the ultimate difference between these two thinkers, then, is that with Rosenzweig we are provided with the tools to develop an ethical theory that has contemporary relevance for responsible relationships, while with Heidegger, who openly rejects ethics as the context for a discourse on human authenticity, we are left with next to nothing. (shrink)

Developing countries face numerous barriers to conducting effective and efficient ethics reviews of international collaborative research. In addition to potentially overlooking important scientific and ethical considerations, inadequate or insufficiently trained ethics committees may insist on unwarranted changes to protocols that can impair a study's scientific or ethical validity. Moreover, poorly functioning review systems can impose substantial delays on the commencement of research, which needlessly undermine the development of new interventions for urgent medical needs. In response to these concerns, the Drugs (...) for Neglected Diseases Initiative, an independent nonprofit organization founded by a coalition of public sector and international organizations, developed a mechanism to facilitate more effective and efficient host country ethics review for a study of the use of fexinidazole for the treatment of late stage African Trypanosomiasis. The project involved the implementation of a novel ‘pre-review’ process of ethical oversight, conducted by an ad hoc committee of ethics committee representatives from African and European countries, in collaboration with internationally recognized scientific experts. This article examines the process and outcomes of this collaborative process. (shrink)

Background. The increased number of clinical trials taking place in developing countries and the complexity of trial protocols mandate that local ethics review committees reviewing them have the capacity to ensure that they are conducted to the highest ethical standards.Methods. The Kenya AIDS Vaccine Initiative Institute of Clinical Research and the Kenyan National Council for Science and Technology embarked on an exercise to enhance the capacity of ERCs in Kenya to review such protocols. This process involved conducting an audit of (...) all ERCs in the country, and performing training needs assessments to identify knowledge and capacity gaps. Information obtained was used to develop training materials for ERC members at workshops conducted in different parts of the country.Results. Five accredited and 13 non-accredited ERCs were identified. Four of the accredited ERCs were located in the capital city of Kenya, Nairobi. The most common challenges cited by participants during the needs assessments were excess workload, and a lack of co-ordination and/or communication between the ERCs. Subsequently, 140 ERC members from 17 institutions across the country were trained as follows: 36 from institutions in the western part of Kenya, 38 from institutions in the south-eastern coastal region, 38 from the eastern region and 44 from Nairobi.Conclusion. The KAVI-ICR and the NCST have developed training modules for training ERC members in Kenya and are in the process of developing a manual to train members. The Kenyan experience may be used to enhance the capacity of ERCs in the East African region. (shrink)

According to Regulatory Focus Theory, two systems determine our strategies to pursue goals – the promotion and the prevention system. Individuals with a dominant promotion system focus on achieving gains, i.e., promoters, and individuals with a dominant prevention system focus on avoiding losses, i.e., preventers. Regulatory Fit Theory suggests that a fit between this focus and the situation causes superior performance and makes individuals feel right. We transfer the fit idea to the interaction of dominant regulatory focus with motivational direction. (...) We investigated these interaction effects on individuals’ performance and their experience within creativity workshops. In Study 1, using multi-level analyses, we found that a promotion focus was associated with fluency and a prevention focus with elaborated ideas. This effect was stronger, when preventers also scored high on avoidance motivation. Further, preventers experienced more autonomy support and were more satisfied when they scored high on avoidance. Promoters high on approach motivation reported more autonomy support and more satisfaction than preventers high on approach motivation. For Study 2, we used an experimental design: After measuring regulatory focus, we manipulated approach vs. avoidance motivation in creativity workshops. Using multi-level analyses, we did not find main or interaction effects on fluency or elaboration but we found interaction effects on participants’ experience of the creativity workshop. Preventers were more satisfied when they received the avoidance condition. Promoters reported less autonomy support, lower satisfaction, and more perceived conflicts within their teams in the avoidance condition. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: I II III IV V VI.

This article discusses three different approaches to human knowledge. The first is that of Peter Simons, a linguistic philosopher, who suggests that language has an underlying algebraic structure. The second approach is that of Ernest Nagel, a philosopher of science, who maintains that the key to knowledge lies in logical analysis. The third approach, due to Michael Polanyi, stresses the idea of tacit integration of parts into composite wholes. All three employ hierarchical schemes, the first two work from the top (...) down, whereas Polanyi works from the bottom up, using the idea of ‘emergence’. (shrink)

Practical philosophy and ethics -- Practical tortise raising -- Truth, beauty, and goodness -- Dilemmas: dithering, plumping, and grief -- Group minds and expressive harm -- Trust, cooperation, and human psychology -- Must we weep for sentimentalism? -- Through thick and thin -- Perspectives, fictions, errors, play -- The steps from doing to saying -- Success semantics -- Wittgenstein's irrealism -- Circles, finks, smells, and biconditionals -- The absolute conception: Putnam vs. Williams -- Julius Caesar and George Berkeley play (...) leapfrog -- The majesty of reason -- Fiction and conviction. (shrink)

In the early 1930s, Franz Rosenzweig’s work was celebrated, criticized and questioned for its relevance within the specific cultural, religious and philosophical preoccupations of the inhabitants of pre-state Israel. This could be seen in nuce at the opening of the Schocken Library in Jerusalem in December 1936 that was marked by a celebratory conference dedicated to the memory of Franz Rosenzweig. The evening featured a collection of four lectures held in Hebrew by eminent German-Jewish scholars: Ernst Simon, Julius (...) Guttmann, Hugo Bergmann and Gershom Scholem. Simon and Scholem’s lectures in particular put forward two strikingly different views on Rosenzweig’s possible Nachleben in the yishuv. The article is followed by Scholem’s hitherto unpublished lecture and Simon’s German summary of his own contribution that evening. (shrink)

This is a one paragraph review of a book by Julius Simon, in German, which book detailed the German editions and reviews of Emerson. According to the review, the book, emphasizes themes in Emerson including "Verinnerlichung" and "Vergeistigung" "stimulated largely in reaction against Nietzsche.".

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Hermeneutical Turn in American Critical Theory, 1830–1860M. D. WalhoutLong considered an obscure province of biblical studies, hermeneutics is now familiar territory to American literary critics, along with phenomenology, structuralism, post-structuralism, and the other European theories that have redrawn the map of American criticism in the past twenty-five years. The gradual transformation of hermeneutics into a theory of criticism, and ultimately into a comprehensive theory of the human sciences, (...) was the work of a series of great German thinkers, including Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer. These figures were introduced (or reintroduced) to American critics by E. D. Hirsch, whose Validity in Interpretation (1967) “shattered,” in the words of Richard E. Palmer, “the splendid isolation of American literary criticism from hermeneutics.” Hailing Schleiermacher and Dilthey as the forefathers of “objective interpretation,” Hirsch dismissed Heidegger and Gadamer as prophets of subjectivism. For his part, Palmer strove to vindicate Heidegger and Gadamer as the true heirs of the hermeneutical tradition. Noting the difference between Hirsch’s understanding of hermeneutics and theirs, Palmer concluded,So the hermeneutical debate goes on. On the one side are the defenders of objectivity and validation, who look to hermeneutics as the theoretical source for norms of validation; on the other side are the phenomenologists of the event of understanding, who stress the historical character of this “event,” and consequently the limitations of all claims to “objective knowledge” and “validity.” 1Twenty-five years later this hermeneutical debate is still going on. [End Page 683]What Hirsch and Palmer did not realize is that they were reviving a debate over the nature of interpretation that dated from the late nineteenth century, when American literary criticism was undergoing professionalization. 2 As early as 1885, in the programmatic introduction to his book on Shakespeare as a dramatic artist, Richard G. Moulton had declared, “In the treatment of literature the proposition which seems to stand most in need of assertion at the present moment is, that there is an inductive science of literary criticism.” Moulton proceeded to lay down “a foundation axiom of inductive literary criticism: Interpretation in literature is of the nature of a scientific hypothesis, the truth of which is tested by the degree of completeness with which it explains the details of the literary work as they actually stand.” 3 Thirty years later Moulton repeated this axiom, insisting that “such inductive treatment constitutes the very alphabet of science.” 4 But Moulton’s determination to apply the logic of the natural sciences to the interpretation of literature was not without its critics. In 1900 the German-born philologist Julius Goebel began a valiant, if futile, effort to introduce the hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and Dilthey to his American colleagues. 5 Years later, in an article published in The Journal of English and Germanic Philology, Goebel drew on Schleiermacher’s Hermeneutik und Kritik (1838) to show “the possibility of attaining exact knowledge in the mental sciences without the aid of the scientific or laboratory methods.” 6 Later still, in an article on Dilthey published in the same journal, Goebel recalled how he had argued in an address to the Modern Language Association that criticism “had lost touch with the contemporary movements emphasizing the independence and importance of the mental sciences. What seemed to me needed above all was a reform of the method of interpretation for which Dilthey had set the example both in principle and practice.” 7 It was not until the late 1960s that Goebel’s project was finally revived.While Goebel may have been the first American literary scholar to use the word “hermeneutics,” the concept of interpretation had long been a part of American critical theory. In fact, what might be called the “hermeneutical turn” in American critical theory occurred well before the era of professionalization. [End Page 684] In order to trace this turn, we must recover the work of the amateur critical theorists of the antebellum era, including such forgotten figures as George Allen and Edwin Percy Whipple. Disciples of the Schlegels and Coleridge, these amateur theorists established the basic premises of the hermeneutical turn: that criticism is a science; that the critic must “reproduce” the author’s creative process; that... (shrink)

Speakers frequently perform representational gestures to depict concepts in an iconic fashion. For example, a speaker may hold her index finger and thumb apart to indicate the size of a matchstick. However, the process by which a physical handshape is mentally transformed into abstract spatial information is not well understood. We present a series of experiments that investigate how people decode the physical form of an articulator to derive imaginary geometrical constructs, which we call “gesture form.” We provide quantitative evidence (...) for several key properties that play a role in this process. First, “profiling,” the ability to focus on a structural subunit within the complex form of the physical hand. Second, “perspective,” for which we show that one and the same handshape seen from different perspectives can lead to different spatial interpretations. Third, “selectivity,” the fact that gestures focus on specific spatial features at the expense of others. Our results provide a first step toward mapping out the process of how representational gestures make the communication of spatial information possible. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 31.3 (2001) 89-107 [Access article in PDF] Teaching DeconstructionGiving, Taking, Leaving, Belonging, and the Remains of the University Simon Morgan Wortham The Remains of the University and the Study of Culture In his recent essay "Literary Study in the Transnational University," J. Hillis Miller tries to account for the hostility shown by some practitioners of a certain kind of cultural studies toward what is perceived as "high" (...) theory—in particular, deconstruction. Describing the emergence of cultural studies as a quasi-discipline, he remarks:Insofar as cultural studies still depends on the traditional idea of culture as the production in a subject or subjectivity of an identity produced through indoctrination by a nation-state or by a subculture such as an ethnic or gender community... it was necessary to resist the questioning by deconstruction of all the key concepts necessary to this idea of culture. These include identity, agency, the homogeneity of a given culture, whether hegemonic or minority, the definition of an individual by his or her participation in a nation or community, the unbreakable tie of a text or any other assemblage of signs to its context. The questioning by theory of these concepts often needed to be sidestepped in order for the project of cultural studies and related new disciplines to get going. These key concepts are glued together by a reinstalled referentiality that can no longer afford to be put in question and remain in question. [83] For Miller, a cultural studies of this sort relies on a minimal degree of retention of such unquestioned "referentiality" as a condition of its need to thematize, narrativize, or interpret various texts, events, and artifacts according to a wider "context" (whether this be described as "historical," "social," or "cultural") to which these phenomena remain unbreakably tied. A "context" such as outlined by Miller would of course need to be accorded a basic level of coherence for the analysis to get underway. Furthermore, insofar as—for Miller—this "context" would thereby establish a more or less generalizable framework within which might be understood the shaping of identity in particular instances, thus facilitating rather traditional ways of determining objects of cognition and knowledge, it could be considered to work so as to reanimate conventional ideas of the "self" or "agency." In assuming that there is always a "context" for every "text," in a way that could be comprehended in the above terms, a cultural studies of the kind described by Miller would reinstall the particular as an expression or exemplar of a more clearly determined situation or setting (history, nation, culture, society, ideology), which, in turn, might be considered to fuel critical misrecognition or reduction of the effects and implications of "transnationality" or "globalization." Furthermore, in this case, the [End Page 89] supposed exemplarity of the particular in its identity with the general would inevitably tend to prompt an account, as Miller himself puts it, of the "production in a subject or subjectivity of an identity" produced by a culture, whether it be hegemonic or minority: the assumed culture of a nation-state or, as is more often emphasized nowadays, a subculture existing in some sort of relation to more dominant cultural practices and trends. In addition to this reinscription of knowledge in relation to the human subject, the founding of a certain kind of cultural study upon longstanding models of cognition, as described above, would reestablish cultural studies practitioners working in this way as themselves knowing subjects. From this perspective, then, Miller would doubtless see certain aspects of the critical landscape of cultural studies—its not infrequent commitment to "identity politics" over the years, its shift of emphasis toward the participatory agency of subjects within contemporary popular culture, even some versions of the debate about the ethics of cultural studies—as set up to reinstall the coextensivity of subjects of knowledge and knowing subjects in a way that would depend uncritically on deeply structured relations of reference, identity, and agency.Miller therefore views cultural studies as, in the last analysis, based on a rather unquestioning reversion to more orthodox humanistic... (shrink)

Bd. 1. Sittlichkeit und Recht -- Bd. 2. Philosophie der Freiheit -- Bd. 3. Interpretation und Kritik -- Bd. 4. Studien zum deutschen Idealismus.

This essay investigates triadic patterns of argument in the thought of Moses Hess. Three kinds of triadic thinking are distinguished: the triadic pattern of three succeeding ages of mankind; the triadic pattern of original unity, fallen or alienated existence, and return to unity on a higher level; and the triad of head, heart and stomach, a symbolism which recurs in the writings of the Young Hegelians. Distinguishing these patterns throws an interesting light on the similarities and differences between the views (...) of Hess and Marx on the role of the proletariat in history. A translation by the author of Hess's "On the Essence of Money" is appended to the essay. (shrink)

On montre comment, dans le Cogito ergo sum, l’idée de mon existence, en tant que je pense, est liée à l’idée de mon existence en tant qu'être pensant. Ainsi se fait voir la compatibilité du caractère originaire de cette connaissance d’une existence avec la prééminence de la proposition universelle : pour pouvoir penser, il faut exister. De la recherche sur le rapport du cogito ergo sum avec le principe de clarté et de distinction il résulte que le cercle reproché à (...) la démonstration cartésienne n’existe pas. Un développement critique sur le spiritualisme cartésien reste réservé. (shrink)